What went wrong in 2016
1. We saw what we wanted to see
“Our brains have a hard time understanding uncertainty,” Hullman says. “People will often ignore that uncertainty, focusing instead on the most likely outcome.”
She cites as an example the FiveThirtyEight graphs leading up to the 2016 election. The solid red and blue lines showed Clinton defeating Trump by a narrow margin, but the wider, blurry stripes of color told a different story: Trump very well could win the election.
“The graph was actually telling us there’s a nontrivial chance that Trump could win, but people don’t know how to think about that,” Hullman says. “And so, people focused on the average prediction, or the most likely thing.”
Image: FiveThirtyEight
2. Charts didn’t show uncertainty
“People tend to struggle with the concept of probability, because it’s hard to define what it is,” Hullman says. “There are great debates about how probability should even be interpreted. Some regard it as the frequency of an event in the long term, while others consider it the subjective belief about the chances of something. It’s not surprising, then, that people aren’t sure how to make sense of a ‘30%’ probability.”
Franconeri echoes this concern. “To really understand probabilities, you have to be trained in statistics — and few people are. In the case of Clinton vs. Trump, many people saw the bar charts with Clinton at 70 percent and Trump at 30 percent, and they thought Clinton was a sure bet, because as a number, 70 is so much larger than 30. But that wasn’t the case at all.”
In fact, Hullman further explains, “The probability of winning is itself a measure that many people don’t understand well. A small difference in ‘vote share’ — or percentage of votes — can translate to a big difference between two candidates’ probabilities of winning. Research suggests that a key problem in communicating election forecast results is that they emphasize probability of winning over predicted vote share.”
Image: FiveThirtyEight
3. We tend to ignore margin of error
“Virtually no one pays attention to margin of error,” Franconeri says.
That can be attributed, at least in part, to our tendency to use mental shortcuts — like focusing on the most likely outcome — and also a phenomenon known as “motivated reasoning.”
“When people desire a particular outcome more than some other, they’re motivated to ignore probability information, which is murky by definition and therefore easy to discard,” Hullman says. “There's a long line of research showing people tend to be more certain than they should be about an outcome, especially when it’s an outcome they are personally invested in.”
So, in the case below, an Obama supporter would be apt to overlook the 3.5-percentage-point margin of error, which suggests Romney could in fact be in the lead over Obama.
Image: CNN
Reader Responses
The other issue with polls is it is hard to capture the impact of the Electoral College and swing states on the election. A few points difference in Michigan and Ohio can change the whole thing.
—Rick Crago '77, Mountain House, Calif.,, via Northwestern Magazine
Thank you very much for this very thoughtful look at the 2016 election. The graph in part 3 showing "How To Do Better" is particularly striking in showing how we can overlook the range of possible outcomes from a poll.
In your hypothetical scenario for 2020 — a Warren 60%, Trump 40% poll — you seem to imply in your icon array and risk theater that the "actual" probability of a Warren win corresponds to the figures in the poll, i.e., that a Warren win could be expected 60% of the time. Is this really what you mean to say or have I misread this?
Wouldn't a 20-point lead in the polls, even with a 4-5% margin of error and a 95% confidence interval, equate to a much greater likelihood of victory? If candidate A leads candidate B 80-20, are you saying candidate B has a 1 in 5 chance of winning?
This is quite at odds with Nick Beaudrot's famous "Myth of the Statistical Tie" argument.
—Jeff San Diego, via Northwestern Magazine
« previous 1 2
No one has commented on this page yet.
Submit a Response